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OPINION 
                    ` 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge.    
 
 This case presents a Supremacy Clause challenge to New 
Jersey's implementation of the Waterfront Commission Act of 1953, 
an interstate compact between New York and New Jersey aimed at 
eliminating racketeering and other pernicious activities in the 
Port of New York District.  Appellant Donald Carson contends that 
§ 8 of that Act conflicts with a 1984 amendment to the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.  29 U.S.C. 
§504(d).  Finding that the 1984 amendment effected no change in 
Carson's rights whatsoever, we hold that his preemption claim is 
barred by the Supreme Court's decision in De Veau v. Braisted, 
363 U.S. 144, 80 S. Ct. 1146 (1960) (plurality opinion), which 
rejected a claim that § 8 conflicted with the pre-1984 version of 
§ 504.  We therefore will affirm the district court's order 
dismissing Carson's claims against the Waterfront Commission 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
I. 
 Donald Carson was an officer in the International 
Longshoremen's Association ("ILA") and two related entities when 
a jury in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey found him guilty of racketeering conspiracy in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and extortion conspiracy in 
3 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951.  Two days later, Gerald 
Lally, the General Counsel to the Waterfront Commission 
("Commission"), advised John Bowers, ILA's President, that 
Carson's continued employment after his conviction would place 
the union in violation of New Jersey's enactment of section 8 of 
the Waterfront Commission Act ("WCA"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-
80,1 which forbids a union from operating as such in New Jersey 
if one of its officers has been "convicted" of certain crimes. 
 Bowers forwarded a copy of Lally's letter to Carson and 
advised him that in light of his conviction, he was suspended 
from his union positions.  Several days later, the Commission, 
through Lally, advised Bowers that suspension of a convicted 
union officer was insufficient to comply with § 8 of the WCA.  
Accordingly, Bowers sent Carson another letter informing him that 
he was being "removed from all offices of the ILA and its 
affiliates and all fringe benefit funds."  Letter from Bowers to 
Carson of 4/25/88, at 1.  Carson appealed his criminal 
                                                           
1
 No person shall solicit, collect or 
receive any dues, assessments, levies, fines 
or contributions, or other charges within 
this State of New Jersey for or on behalf of 
any labor organization, which represents 
employees registered or licensed pursuant to 
the provisions of this act . . . if any 
officer . . . has been convicted by a court 
of the United States, or any State or 
territory thereof, of treason, murder, 
manslaughter or any felony, high misdemeanor 
or misdemeanor involving  moral turpitude, or 
any crime or offense enumerated in 
subdivision 3(b) of section 5-n of this act, 
unless he has been subsequently pardoned 
therefor . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-80. 
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conviction, and we vacated the judgment.  United States v. 
Carson, 969 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir. 1992). The indictment ultimately 
was dismissed. 
 Carson brought this suit against the Commission, Lally 
and various ILA officials.2  His principal claim was that by 
enforcing § 8 of the WCA, which required his removal upon the 
return of a guilty verdict, the defendants conspired to deprive 
him of wages to which he claims convicted-but-exonerated 
officials are entitled under the 1984 amendment to § 504 of the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA").  
Section 504(d) of the LMRDA requires unions to escrow the wages 
of an official "barred by virtue of [that] section" and to remit 
those wages to the official if he is ultimately exonerated.  29 
U.S.C. § 504(d). Since the escrow provision does not take effect 
until there is a "conviction," which § 504(c) defines as the 
entry of a judgment of conviction (i.e., at sentencing), Carson 
alleged that the Commission's action in seeking and obtaining his 
removal based on the state-law interpretation of the term 
                                                           
2Carson's claims against the ILA officials were enjoined pursuant 
to a December 21, 1994, order of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, which had before it a 
massive civil RICO action against ILA and Carson. That action 
ultimately resulted in a judgment against Carson, and an appeal 
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was partially 
successful.  United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 
1995).  Both parties to that appeal have petitioned for 
rehearing.  In the meantime, Carson had appealed separately from 
the Southern District's order enjoining his claims against the 
ILA defendants.  By stipulation, however, that appeal was being 
held in abeyance pending the resolution of the parties' 
respective petitions for rehearing.  The district court, 
therefore, granted Carson's request for an administrative 
termination of his claims against the ILA defendants. 
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"conviction" in § 8 of the WCA (i.e., a guilty verdict) 
contravened the Supremacy Clause and was unlawful. 
 In granting the Commission's motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, the district court disagreed.  
Separating its analysis into two parts, the district court first 
looked to whether the definition of "conviction" in § 8 of the 
WCA contravened the pre-1984 version of § 504 of the LMRDA, which 
defined "conviction" as a judgment from which no further appeals 
could be taken.  The district court noted initially that the 
Supreme Court in De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S. Ct. 
1146 (1960) (plurality opinion), held that § 8 of the WCA was not 
preempted by the pre-1984 version of § 504 of the LMRDA.  Then, 
relying on International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront 
Commission, 642 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 966, 
102 S. Ct. 509 (1981), and Local 1804, International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront Commission, 428 A.2d 1283 
(N.J. 1981), the district court concluded that "[i]t has been 
judicially settled that section 504(c)'s pre-1984 definition of 
'conviction' did not pre-empt the viability of section 8."  J. 
App. at 91. 
 The district court then turned to the current version 
of § 504 of the LMRDA and determined that 
[t]he present definition of 
"conviction" under section 504(c) 
reads closer to the original, 
practical thrust of section 8.  The 
addition of section 504(d) has not 
imposed additional responsibilities 
upon the Commission or Lally.  That 
section does not require the 
Waterfront Commission to establish 
6 
and maintain an escrow account for 
the benefit of union officials. 
Therefore, neither the change of 
504(c) nor the addition of 504(d) 
presents a significant departure 
from section 504 pre-1984 to 
invalidate section 8. 
 
App. at 91-92.  After holding that Lally, the Commission's 
General Counsel, was entitled to qualified immunity, the district 
court dismissed Carson's complaint against both the Commission 
and Lally. This appeal followed.  Carson does not challenge the 
district court's qualified immunity determination in this appeal. 
II. 
 The district court's jurisdiction was premised upon 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 and 1367.  The district court directed entry 
of final judgment on Carson's claims against the Commission under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  Our jurisdiction over this appeal from a 
final determination of the district court rests on 28 U.S.C. 
§1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim. 
III. 
 The gravamen of Carson's Supremacy Clause challenge is 
that the 1984 amendment to § 504 of the LMRDA, which created the 
escrow requirement, expressed a clear congressional intent that 
criminally convicted union officials who are removed from office 
but ultimately exonerated should be entitled to their wages: 
"[t]his new subsection . . . is designed to mitigate the harm of 
a wrongful conviction."  Carson's Br. at 13.  Since strict 
7 
application of New Jersey's interpretation of the term 
"conviction" in § 8 of the WCA operates to remove convicted union 
officials before § 504(d)'s escrow requirement can be triggered, 
Carson contends, the Supremacy Clause requires that the WCA bow 
to the paramount federal policy.  We disagree. 
A. 
 Carson hinges his claim on the 1984 amendment to § 504 
ostensibly because the Supreme Court's decision in De Veau, 363 
U.S. at 144, 80 S. Ct. at 1146, rejected a generalized claim that 
§ 8 of the WCA was preempted by the pre-1984 version § 504 of the 
LMRDA and because both the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit and the New Jersey Supreme Court, prior to 1984, rejected 
the very claim Carson raises here.  See International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront Comm'n, 642 F.2d 666 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 966, 102 S. Ct. 509 (1981); Local 
1804, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront Comm'n, 428 A.2d 
1283 (N.J. 1981).  Therefore, as a way around this rather 
formidable body of precedent, Carson has attempted to demonstrate 
an intervening change in the law which would render De Veau and 
its progeny inapplicable. 
 Carson's argument that the escrow provision added by 
the 1984 amendment to § 504 demonstrates a special congressional 
concern with "mitigat[ing] the harm of a wrongful conviction" is 
fatally flawed at its inception.  As the district court's 
discussion implied, the post-1984 version of 29 U.S.C. § 504 
expressed no more of a congressional intent "to mitigate the harm 
of a wrongful conviction" than did the pre-1984 version.  On the 
8 
contrary, convicted union officials are in fact worse off after 
the 1984 amendment.  A comparison of the former and current 
versions of § 504, the pertinent provisions of which we will set 
forth in the margin, demonstrates this conclusively. 
 Under the pre-1984 version of § 504,3 a union official 
was required to be suspended for five years upon being 
"convicted" of certain crimes.  The statute defined "conviction" 
as a judgment from which no further appeals have been or could 
have been taken. Thus, under federal law, union officials 
convicted of a crime listed in § 504 could retain their positions 
and receive wages until such time as their appeals had been 
exhausted; only those officials whose convictions were upheld on 
appeal were required to step down.  The obvious effect was that 
criminally convicted officials were entitled to work and receive 
                                                           
3(a) [P]ersons convicted of robbery, bribery, etc. 
 
 No person who . . . has been convicted of, or 
served any part of a prison term resulting from his 
conviction of, [certain enumerated crimes] . . . shall 
serve-- 
  (1) as an officer . . . of any labor 
organization, 
    . . . . 
during or for five years after . . . such conviction . 
. . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
(c) Definitions 
 
 For the purposes of this section, any person shall 
be deemed to have been  "convicted" . . . from the date 
of the judgment of the trial court or the date of the 
final sustaining of such judgment on appeal, whichever 
is the later event . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 504 (1982) (amended 1984 & 1987). 
9 
wages during the pendency of their appeals irrespective of 
whether they were ultimately exonerated. 
 The 1984 amendment, however, required that convicted 
union officials be removed far sooner than under the previous 
version of § 504.  Under the current version,4 all convicted 
                                                           
4
 (a) [P]ersons convicted of robbery, bribery, etc. 
 
 No person who . . . has been convicted of, or 
served any part of a prison term resulting from his 
conviction of, [certain enumerated crimes] . . . shall 
serve or be permitted to serve-- 
    . . . . 
  (2) as an officer . . . of any labor 
organization, 
    . . . . 
 
during or for the period of thirteen years after such 
conviction or after the end of such imprisonment, 
whichever is later . . . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
(c) Definitions 
 
 For the purpose of this section-- 
   (1) A person shall be deemed to have been 
"convicted" . . . from the date of the judgment of the 
trial court, regardless of whether that judgment 
remains under appeal. 
   . . . . 
 
(d) Salary of person barred from labor organization 
office during appeal of conviction 
 
   Whenever any person-- 
   (1) by operation of this section, has been 
barred from office . . . as a result of a conviction, 
and 
   (2) has filed an appeal of that conviction, 
 
any salary which would be otherwise due such person by 
virtue of such office or position, shall be placed in 
escrow by the individual employer or organization 
responsible for payment of such salary.  Payment of 
such salary into escrow shall continue for the duration 
10 
officials must be removed from office upon entry of a judgment of 
conviction (i.e., at sentencing).  See 29 U.S.C. § 504(c).  If 
that had been the extent of the 1984 amendment, exonerated and 
non-exonerated officials alike no longer would have been entitled 
to wages during the pendency of their appeals.  Therefore, 
Congress also added subsection (d) to § 504, requiring that 
unions place the wages of a convicted official into an escrow 
account in the event that the official ultimately is exonerated.  
If the official is not exonerated, the wages revert back to the 
union.  If the official is exonerated, however, he is entitled to 
the wages, but, unlike the pre-1984 state of affairs, is barred 
from office in the interim. 
 Far from representing the significant, beneficial 
change in the rights of wrongfully convicted officials that 
Carson would have us ascribe to it, the escrow requirement added 
by the 1984 amendment simply maintains the status quo.  
Convicted-but-exonerated officials, both before and after 1984, 
are entitled to receive their wages during the pendency of their 
appeals.  But viewed as a whole, the 1984 amendment contained two 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the appeal . . . . Upon the final reversal of such 
person's conviction on appeal, the amounts in escrow 
shall be paid to such person.  Upon the final 
sustaining of such person's conviction on appeal, the 
amounts in escrow shall be returned to the individual 
employer or organization responsible for payments of 
those amounts.  Upon final reversal of such person's 
conviction, such person shall no longer be barred by 
this statute from assuming any position from which such 
person was previously barred. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 504 (1988) (as amended) (emphasis added). 
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serious drawbacks for convicted union officials: (1) non-
exonerated officials no longer are entitled to their wages during 
appeal; and (2) exonerated officials, although entitled to wages 
during the pendency of their appeals, are not permitted to work 
during that time.  Accordingly, Carson's claim that Congress' 
1984 amendment to § 504 evinces a special concern with 
"mitigat[ing] the harm of a wrongful conviction" is inaccurate. 
B. 
 Since the 1984 amendment worked no positive change in 
Carson's rights as a wrongfully convicted official, his only 
plausible Supremacy Clause claim is that to the extent state-
court decisions define the term "conviction" in § 8 of the WCA as 
a verdict of guilty, that definition has always been preempted by 
section 504 of the LMRDA.  Indeed, prior to 1984, federal law 
permitted all convicted officials to remain in office until their 
appeals had been exhausted, which necessarily means that the 
conflict between § 8 and the pre-1984 version of § 504 was even 
more glaring.  If Carson is correct, then § 8 presumably must 
yield to § 504 after 1984 since it should have yielded all along. 
 To prevail on the merits of his claim, however, Carson 
faces a nearly insurmountable hurdle in form of the Supreme 
Court's decision in De Veau, 363 U.S. at 144, 80 S. Ct. at 1146.  
As we noted above, De Veau specifically rejected a challenge to § 
8 of the WCA as being inconsistent with the pre-1984 version of § 
504 of the LMRDA, and two subsequent pre-1984 decisions, relying 
on De Veau, rejected the very claim Carson advances here.  There 
are two potential paths around De Veau and the decisions relying 
12 
on it; Carson urges that we follow both.  We consider each one in 
turn. 
1. 
 Carson implies that De Veau should not apply here 
because it was decided in 1960 and it was not until 1981 that 
state and federal courts began to interpret the term "conviction" 
in § 8 of the WCA to mean a guilty verdict.  See, e.g., 
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 642 F.2d at 666; Local 1804, 
428 A.2d at 1283.  Thus, the argument continues, De Veau could 
not have foreclosed a claim of inconsistency between § 8 of the 
WCA and §504 that was essentially unforeseeable in 1960.  While 
this argument has some logical appeal, De Veau's broad rationale 
requires that we reject it. 
 De Veau was a declaratory judgment action in which the 
plaintiffs alleged that § 8 of the WCA, through its rather severe 
disqualification provisions, unduly interfered with their rights 
under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") to choose 
bargaining representatives.  Plaintiffs also alleged that § 8's 
disqualification provisions were harsher than those contained in 
§504 of the LMRDA and, thus, the former was impliedly preempted 
by the latter.  (The most glaring inconsistency was that § 8 
provided for a lifetime bar of convicted officials whereas § 504 
required only a five-year disqualification.)  After exhaustively 
tracing the developments leading to the submission to and 
approval by Congress of the WCA and its enactment by the New York 
and New Jersey legislatures, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the 
plurality, rejected the preemption claim regarding the NLRA.  He 
13 
did so on the ground that Congress, in approving the WCA, had 
expressly consented to supplemental legislation like § 8 even 
though it technically was not part of the compact.  De Veau, 363 
U.S. at 150-54, 80 S. Ct. at 1150-51. 
  Turning to the plaintiffs' contention that § 8 
conflicted with the federal policy codified in § 504 of the 
LMRDA, Justice Frankfurter observed two separate reasons strongly 
militating against a finding of preemption.  The first was that  
Congress itself has . . . imposed 
the same type of restriction upon 
employees' freedom to choose 
bargaining representatives as New 
York seeks to impose through § 8, 
namely, disqualification of ex-
felons for union office[. That] is 
surely evidence that Congress does 
not view such a restriction as 
incompatible with its labor 
policies. 
 
Id. at 156, 80 S. Ct. at 1152.  Significantly, the general policy 
of excluding convicted officials, not specific claimed 
inconsistencies, was the focus of the High Court's preemption 
analysis.  
 Responding to the plaintiffs' specific contention that 
"any state disablement from holding union office on account of a 
prior felony conviction, such as § 8, which has terms at variance 
with § 504(a), is impliedly barred by it," id., Justice 
Frankfurter concluded that 
[j]ust the opposite conclusion is 
indicated by the 1959 Act, which 
reflects congressional awareness of 
the problems of pre-emption in the 
area of labor legislation, and 
which did not leave the solution of 
questions of pre-emption to 
14 
inference.  When Congress meant 
pre-emption to flow from the 1959 
Act it expressly so provided.  
Sections 205(c) and 403 . . . are 
express provisions excluding the 
operation of state law, 
supplementing provisions for new 
federal regulation.  No such pre-
emption provision was provided in 
connection with § 504[a].  That 
alone is sufficient reason for not 
deciding that § 504(a) pre-empts § 
8 of the [WCA]. 
 
Id. at 156, 80 S. Ct. at 1152-53 (emphasis added).  The plurality 
then cited to a provision in the LMRDA that, in its view, 
expressed a clear congressional intent to allow state legislation 
such as §8 of the WCA: 
And  to make the matter conclusive, 
§ 603(a) is an express disclaimer 
of pre-emption of state laws 
regulating the responsibilities of 
union officials, except where such 
pre-emption is expressly provided 
in the 1959 Act. . . . In view of 
this explicit and elaborate 
treatment of pre-emption in the 
1959 Act, no inference can possibly 
arise that §8 is impliedly pre-
empted by §504(a). 
 
Id. at 157, 80 S. Ct. at 1153. 
 
 The ratio decidendi of the De Veau plurality's decision 
is that § 8 and § 504(a) are compatible precisely because they 
both are aimed at removing criminal elements from union office; 
any friction between the two is constitutionally permissible 
because §504 lacks specific preemption language.  We understand 
De Veau, therefore, to reject a "facial" challenge to any and all 
claimed inconsistencies between § 8 of the WCA and § 504 of the 
15 
LMRDA. Standing alone, this would appear to mandate an affirmance 
since no preemption language has been added to section 504 since 
De Veau was decided.  
2. 
 Carson urges, however, that to the extent that De 
Veau's holding purports to bar any prospective claim of 
inconsistency between § 8 of the WCA and § 504 of the LMRDA, it 
was a plurality opinion and, thus, De Veau and its progeny do not 
stand as a per se bar to his preemption claim.  While this 
argument also has some measure of surface appeal, after reading 
Justice Brennan's opinion concurring in the judgment, we are not 
persuaded. 
 We would agree with Carson had Justice Brennan refused 
to join Justice Frankfurter's opinion because he believed that 
its reliance on the lack of express preemption language would 
needlessly bring within its sweep all future claims of 
inconsistency between § 8 and § 504 and impliedly reject them.  
But that is not why Justice Brennan wrote separately.  On the 
contrary, Justice Brennan agreed with the plurality's result 
precisely because Congress expressly had consented to parallel 
state legislation in enacting the LMRDA: 
Mr. Justice BRENNAN is of the 
opinion that . . . the [LMRDA] 
explicitly provides that it shall 
not displace such legislation of 
the States.  He believes that New 
York's disqualifications of ex-
felons from waterfront union 
office, on all the circumstances, 
and as applied to this specific 
area, is a reasonable means for 
16 
achieving a legitimate state aim . 
. . . 
 
De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160-61, 80 S. Ct. at 1155 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  This language essentially mirrors 
the second reason Justice Frankfurter offered for finding that § 
504 did not preempt § 8. 
 Justice Brennan's concurrence suggests at most a 
disagreement with the plurality's methodology in rejecting the 
plaintiff's initial contention that § 8 was preempted by the 
NLRA. By noting that the LMRDA itself was sufficient evidence of 
a congressional intent not to preempt § 8, Justice Brennan 
implied that there was no need to conclude, as had the plurality, 
that in approving the WCA Congress gave its express imprimatur to 
state legislation like § 8 (which was not technically part of the 
compact).  Because the NLRA is not offered as a basis for 
preemption in this case, the concurrence's differences with the 
plurality on that issue are irrelevant.  Quite simply, five 
Justices agreed in De Veau that in enacting the LMRDA in 1959, 
Congress explicitly assented to the enactment of parallel state 
restrictions on convicted union workers except where it expressly 
had provided to the contrary.  Accordingly, Carson's claim that 
De Veau lacks precedential value because it was a plurality 
opinion is without merit.  
 Finally, we observe that in 1984 the Supreme Court 
specifically reaffirmed De Veau's basic premise that the LMRDA 
expressed a clear congressional intent not to preempt state 
regulation of union officials.  Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant 
17 
Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 506, 
104 S. Ct. 3179, 3188 (1984) ("[Section] 504 itself makes clear 
that Congress did not seek to impose a uniform federal standard 
on those who may serve as union officials.").  Although Brown 
dealt with a claim that New Jersey's regulation of unions in the 
casino industry conflicted with the NLRA, much of the Brown 
Court's analysis was devoted to comparing New Jersey's regulatory 
scheme to the New York version of § 8 of the WCA scrutinized in 
De Veau.  In the process, Brown reaffirmed De Veau's refusal to 
find § 8 preempted by federal labor policy.  Since De Veau 
controls, we conclude that Congress' refusal to add any specific 
preemption language to § 504 since De Veau was decided compels an 
affirmance. 
 The district court's order of April 7, 1995, dismissing 
Carson's claims against the Waterfront Commission will be 
affirmed. 
